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in Bougainville. Independence in both places 
is probably only possible because of large‑scale 
mining: the existing nickel mines in New 
Caledonia and the giant Panguna copper and 
gold mine, or possibly even new mines, in 
Bougainville. In both places, there are fierce 
debates over the costs and benefits of mining.
There are few deferred independence 
referendums on the global stage (South Sudan 
being one of the rare examples), so these two 
Melanesian islands set important precedents 
beyond the Pacific (Thomas 2011). New Caledonia’s 
initial referendum takes place on 4 November 
2018, but there is uncertainty over the timing of 
Bougainville’s vote. In both cases, will domestic 
and regional pressures seek to continue some form 
of transition to avoid renewed conflict? Will two 
sovereign and independent nations be created, or 
will the process end in some innovative form of 
ongoing relationship with Paris and Port Moresby? 
The future for New Caledonia and Bougainville 
takes on greater regional importance, as the 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG) debate the issue of West 
Papua. Pacific leaders are trying to reconcile 
the growing push for self‑determination by 
the West Papuan nationalist movement and 
the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty 
over Papua and West Papua provinces by most 
Forum member governments. Changes to New 
Caledonia’s political status have crucial implications 
for the other French Pacific dependencies, 
French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna.
Introduction
Over the next few years, major political — and 
possibly constitutional — changes can be 
expected in two of Australia’s closest 
neighbours, as New Caledonia and Bougainville 
move towards a new political status. 
Both sets of islands suffered periods of armed 
conflict — in the 1980s for New Caledonia and 
in the 1990s for Bougainville. In spite of the 
widespread calls for independence, there were 
significant divisions within the population and 
both conflicts ended with innovative political 
and constitutional agreements, including delayed 
referendums on their final political status. 
Since 1998, each has undertaken a lengthy 
transition towards a decision on self‑determination 
and the possible creation of a new sovereign and 
independent nation. These transitional periods 
of economic and political reformation are now 
coming to a head. Under the 1998 Noumea Accord, 
New Caledonia is scheduled to hold up to three 
referendums between 2018 and 2022 to determine 
a new political status, with the first vote to be held 
in November 2018. After a decade‑long transition 
following the 2005 election of the Autonomous 
Bougainville Government (ABG), and 2015 
elections that resulted in the return to office of 
President John Momis, there are currently plans to 
hold a referendum in Bougainville in June 2019. 
Despite their very different histories, there 
are a few striking similarities between New 
Caledonia and Bougainville. The sizes of their 
population is one, with approximately 270,000 
people in New Caledonia and about 300,000 
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against the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak 
et Socialiste (FLNKS or Kanak Socialist National 
Liberation Front), a coalition of parties supporting 
independence. The period of conflict, known 
as les événements, polarised the country, with 
the independence movement boycotting French 
elections and institutions and creating parallel 
political structures in Kanak‑majority rural areas. 
After four years of conflict, this period culminated 
in the Ouvéa massacre of May 1988 with the death 
of 19 Kanak activists and two French Special Forces 
soldiers. The contending parties turned away from 
armed conflict, signing the 1988 Matignon‑Oudinot 
Accords. The aftermath of grief and division 
on the island of Ouvéa led to the assassination 
of FLNKS leader Jean‑Marie Tjibaou on 4 May 
1989 when he came to commemorate a year of 
mourning for the victims of the Ouvéa massacre.
The Matignon‑Oudinot Accords proposed 
a 10‑year transition to a referendum on 
independence in 1998, but as that deadline 
approached, political leaders decided that the 
referendum should be deferred. This would allow a 
further period of political settlement, the creation 
of a shared ‘new Caledonian citizenship’ and the 
building of ‘a common destiny’ (Christnacht 2004). 
The delay would also allow further economic 
rebalancing between the capital Noumea and 
outlying rural areas, given the colonial legacies of 
land tenure, mining and infrastructure distribution 
that had disadvantaged indigenous Kanaks. 
On 5 May 1998, an agreement known as the 
Noumea Accord was signed by representatives 
of the French state, the FLNKS independence 
movement and the anti‑independence party 
Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la 
République (RPCR or Rally for New Caledonia 
in the Republic). This Accord determined that 
any vote on New Caledonia’s final political status 
would be delayed for a transitional period of 20 
years. The transition would be based on new 
political institutions, including three provincial 
assemblies, a congress, a customary senate for 
the indigenous Kanak people and a multi‑party 
government that could unite supporters and 
opponents of independence in the collegial 
governance of the nation (Faberon 2012).
Parts 1 and 2 of this Discussion Paper comprise 
two separate case studies on New Caledonia 
and Bougainville. Each details the referendum 
provisions of their peace agreements and the 
main steps and timelines towards referendums on 
self‑determination, as well as the political stresses 
and tension points that might lead to alternative 
scenarios. In each case there are significant 
political, cultural and economic pressures that may 
derail the process towards independence with a 
diverse range of players involved in the outcome.
Part 3 outlines eight areas that will 
affect the transition to a new political 
status, comparing and contrasting the 
situation in the two Melanesian nations: 
• the success of brokering peace
• post‑conflict reconciliation 
• relations with the metropole 
• the constitutional embedding of the 
political agreement 
• resolving control and decision‑making on 
mining and natural resources
• international scrutiny
• monitoring the Accord
• the possibility of abandoning the agreed 
process.
Part 1: New Caledonia — the Noumea 
Accord and New Caledonia’s referendum on 
self‑determination
New Caledonia comprises the main island Grande 
Terre, the Loyalty Islands and other outlying 
island groups. The Melanesian nation was 
colonised by France in 1853. Its population has 
grown to 268,767 (ISEE, 2014 census) through 
waves of migration and colonial settlement: 
prisoners, free settlers, indentured labour and 
more recent migrants, mostly from France 
and other French colonial dependencies. 
From the founding in 1953 of Union 
Calédonienne (UC or Caledonian Union)  to 
the creation of independence parties in the 
mid‑1970s, the indigenous Kanak people has 
formed political coalitions to campaign for greater 
autonomy and then independence from France. 
Between 1984 and 1988, a period of armed 
conflict pitted the French state and armed settlers 
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and transformation from citizenship to 
nationality’ (Article 5 Noumea Accord).
Timing of the referendum
The timing of a referendum on self‑determination 
was originally detailed in section 5 of the Noumea 
Accord and article 217 of the Organic Law: 
A poll will be held during the fourth 
(five‑year) Congress term of office. The date 
of the poll will be set by the Congress in 
the course of the fourth term, by a qualified 
majority of three‑fifths of its members. If the 
Congress has not set such date by the end of 
the second‑to‑last year of this fourth term, 
the poll will be held, on a date set by the State, 
during the last year of the Congress term.
Thus the congress elected in May 2014 
could have, by three‑fifths majority, decided 
on a date for a self‑determination referendum. 
Given the longstanding balance of forces in 
the congress, where no individual party has 
won a majority, the requirement that 33 of the 
54 members of congress agree on the date was 
deliberately designed so that both supporters 
and opponents of independence must come to a 
common decision to proceed to a referendum.
If the congress was unable to agree on a 
date for a referendum, the French state was 
obliged to organise a referendum in the final 
year of this five‑year term of the congress. 
This state‑organised vote, however, cannot be 
held within six months of the next elections 
(scheduled in May 2019), so must be held after 
1 June 2018 but before 30 November 2018.
After lengthy political disagreements between 
supporters and opponents of independence, the 
date was finally agreed in March 2018 at the 
Committee of Signatories (a meeting between 
the French Government, the original signatories 
to the Noumea Accord, and representatives of 
other major parties represented in the congress). 
The date for the referendum is now set for 
4 November 2018, with the question: ‘Do you 
want New Caledonia to accede to full sovereignty 
and become independent?’ This wording is 
a compromise between the FLNKS position 
favouring the words ‘full sovereignty’ rather than 
Provisions of the Noumea Accord
Since the first provincial assembly elections 
in May 1999, this transition has involved the 
transfer of powers from Paris to Noumea over 
many aspects of policy and administration. 
However, pending the final referendum on 
self‑determination, the French state retains 
control over five so‑called ‘sovereign powers’ 
(compétences régaliennes): justice and courts, 
public order and policing, finance and currency, 
defence, and most aspects of foreign relations.
The French state has committed to financing 
this process and agreed on the ‘irreversibility’ 
of the transfers (that is, any powers ceded to the 
government and congress of New Caledonia cannot 
be reclaimed by Paris, which is unique compared 
to autonomy statutes in French Polynesia, Wallis 
and Futuna and other French collectivities). 
The Noumea Accord was approved in a 
November 1998 referendum, then formalised 
in French domestic law through a March 1999 
Organic Law and entrenched in articles 76 and 77 
of the French constitution in its own sui generis 
section. The Accord proposed a referendum on 
self‑determination with an initial vote to be held 
between the years 2014 and 2018 (article 53 of the 
French constitution is the legal basis for any such 
referendum, which ‘cannot be conducted without 
the consent of the concerned populations’).
The Noumea Accord proposed that a 
consultation of the ‘concerned population’ should 
decide on the transfer of the remaining sovereign 
powers. Article 3.3 of the Accord notes: 
Justice, law and order, defence and currency 
(including credit and exchange), as well as 
external affairs (subject to the provisions of 
3.2.1) will remain under the responsibility of 
the State until the new political organisation 
is introduced as a result of the poll provided 
for in Section 5.
The Accord also states that this vote 
will be based on a limited franchise of New 
Caledonian citizens (rather than all French 
residents) and will focus on ‘the transfer of the 
sovereign powers to New Caledonia, accession 
to an international status of full responsibility 
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the word ‘independence’ (which ironically was 
favoured by the anti‑independence side). In turn, 
the FLNKS resisted attempts by anti‑independence 
parties to include the option of ‘remaining 
with France’ as part of the yes/no decision.
The Noumea Accord actually makes provision 
for three referendums rather than just one. If the 
New Caledonian population votes in the negative 
in the first referendum, there is a mechanism 
for two more votes to be held. One third of 
the members of congress can call for a second 
referendum, to be held in the second year after 
the first vote. In the case of a second negative 
vote on independence, the procedure can be 
repeated again to hold a third referendum. If the 
response is still negative, then the signatories 
to the Accord must meet to determine the next 
step. For this reason, the full implementation 
of three proposed referendums might extend 
the process from 2018 until 2022 or beyond.
Electoral rolls
In response to Kanak concerns about ongoing 
migration from France, Wallis and Futuna, Tahiti 
and other locales, the Noumea Accord created 
different electoral rolls for different political 
institutions (a system of affirmative action for 
long‑term residents that has been endorsed by 
the French courts, the European Court of Human 
Rights and the UN Human Rights Council).
For the French National Assembly and Senate 
in Paris, the European Parliament and local 
municipal councils, all French nationals of voting 
age (18) and registered at the relevant town hall 
on a general electoral roll are eligible to vote. 
In contrast, voting for New Caledonia’s three 
provincial assemblies and congress is restricted to 
long‑term New Caledonian citizens rather than all 
French nationals. This restriction meant that more 
than 23,000 French residents of New Caledonia 
were ineligible to vote in the May 2014 provincial 
elections, even though they could vote in the 
March 2014 municipal elections (Maclellan 2015).
To complicate matters further, the electoral 
roll of long‑term residents for the provincial 
assemblies has a different residency requirement to 
the separate roll for the final referendum. For the 
local political institutions, New Caledonian citizens 
must be registered to vote and resident for ten years 
before 31 December 1998. However article 2.2.1 of 
the 1998 Accord and article 218 of the 1999 Organic 
Law set out a different residency requirement for 
the ultimate referendum(s) on the future of New 
Caledonia (essentially 20 years’ residency by 2014).
These original eligibility provisions, however, 
have been superseded in part by court rulings 
as part of a long‑running debate over who will 
be eligible to vote in 2018, as supporters and 
opponents of independence manoeuvre before 
the referendum. The February 2016 meeting of 
the Committee of Signatories agreed that new 
voting rights could not be obtained for people 
arriving after 8 November 1998 and declared 
that the whole issue was ‘politically closed’ (LNC 
2016). However, this declaration has not stopped 
political and legal challenges to voting rights.
The longstanding belief that all Kanak adults 
would automatically vote was overturned by the 
August 2015 decision of a French constitutional 
court which ruled that all potential referendum 
voters must be registered on France’s general 
electoral roll. This ruling presented a major 
problem — from a total of 90,949 Kanak adults 
with customary status, only 65,467 were registered 
on the general electoral roll (as of 1 January 2016). 
This meant that up to 25,282 Kanaks, who had 
never been properly enrolled, might therefore 
be ineligible to participate in the referendum 
on self‑determination. At the same time, the 
status of hundreds more voters of European or 
Wallisian heritage was challenged between 2016 
and 2018 as independence supporters questioned 
whether they met residency requirements.
These numbers have been the subject of 
great dispute, as pro‑independence supporters 
sought automatic registration for all indigenous 
people on the general voter list. Loyalists in turn 
claimed special rights for non‑Kanak residents. 
By the end of 2017, negotiations resulted 
in agreement for automatic registration on 
the general list for Kanak voters, and special 
measures to identify non‑Kanak eligible voters 
with long‑term interests in New Caledonia. The 
French government accepted that another 11,000 
people (holding Kanak customary status or 
common law civil status) should be added to the 
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(there is the precedent of Comoros where one if 
its islands, Mayotte, voted to remain French while 
the rest of the French Indian Ocean dependency 
moved to independence in 1975, a clear breach 
of international law on decolonisation).
Decolonisation or delay?
Although the process outlined above is enshrined 
in law and the French constitution, and even 
after 20 years of transition, competing political 
forces in New Caledonia still perceive the 
Noumea Accord in different ways: some see the 
transition as a decolonisation process; for others, 
the question of political independence can still 
be delayed for years, if not forever. Most parties 
in the independence movement continue to call 
for the full implementation of the Accord, to 
create a fully sovereign and independent nation.
A range of academics and French officials have 
also canvassed options for New Caledonia to adopt 
some form of free association within the French 
Republic. After consultations between 2011 and 
2013, French public servant Jean Courtial and 
academic Ferdinand Mélin‑Soucramanien presented 
their report ‘Réflexions sur l’avenir institutionnel 
de la Nouvelle‑Calédonie’ (Reflections on the 
institutional future for New Caledonia) to the 
Committee of Signatories to the Noumea Accord 
on 11 October 2013. They suggested four options 
for the future but, according to critics, slanted 
these options towards a model of free association 
(Courtail and Mélin‑Soucramanien 2013).
The formal referendum provisions of 
the Accord have long been questioned by 
anti‑independence politicians (even by those who 
signed the agreement in 1998). Different political 
parties have expressed divergent views on which 
path should be followed to ‘exit’ from the Noumea 
Accord. Even though they wish to retain links to 
France, there are clear differences between the 
anti‑independence parties on the way forward.
Pierre Frogier, a key leader of Les Républicains 
(formerly Rassemblement–UMP) has called for 
negotiations with the independence movement 
leading to a third accord (following the 1988 
Matignon‑Oudinot Accords and the 1998 Noumea 
Accord). In contrast, the largest single party in 
the congress, Calédonie Ensemble (CE) led by 
general electoral roll. With government programs 
to enrol potential voters, the number of correctly 
registered people has risen from 153,000 to a 
potential 175,000 when the referendum electoral 
roll is finally released on 31 August 2018 (LNC 
2018). The closing date for registration on the 
general electoral list was originally set as 30 
December 2017, but this has been extended three 
times (until 30 July 2018 at time of writing).
The delay by the French state to resolve the issue 
of voting rights earlier in the 20‑year transition has 
threatened to delegitimise any vote in 2018, with 
the small Parti Travailliste (Labour Party) deciding 
not to participate in the November referendum. It is 
a recipe for division at a time when New Caledonia 
is supposed to be building a ‘common destiny’ for 
the future of the country. For some independence 
supporters, it reaffirms their doubts about the 
supposed neutrality of the French authorities.
Article 216 of the Organic Law states that the 
result of the referendum will be determined by the 
majority of those voting, not those registered to 
vote, which discourages one or other party from 
organising a boycott to create a low turnout.
With many Kanak voters from the outer 
islands living and working in the capital, specific 
provisions have been made to allow them to vote 
either in Noumea or in their home municipality. 
Islanders from Lifou, Ouvéa, Mare, Belep and 
the Isle of Pines can register at the French High 
Commission between June and September 2018, 
so they can vote in the referendum without 
making an expensive trip to the outer islands. 
Another crucial provision of the Noumea 
Accord is that New Caledonia cannot be divided 
geographically during the self‑determination 
process. Section 5 of the Accord notes: ‘The 
result of the poll will apply comprehensively to 
New Caledonia as a whole. It will not be possible 
for one part of New Caledonia alone to achieve 
full sovereignty, or alone to retain different 
links with France, on the grounds that its results 
in the poll differed from the overall result’.
The FLNKS lobbied for this provision to 
ensure that the two Kanak‑dominated provinces 
in the north and Loyalty Islands did not choose 
independence while the European‑dominated 
southern province remained associated with France 
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Philippe Gomes, has called for shared sovereignty 
with France and the greatest possible autonomy, 
arguing that ‘independence supporters will not win the 
referendums, but neither will they sign a third accord’.1 
Some conservative leaders have also called for 
the re‑establishment of the glissant (sliding) electoral 
roll (which would enable more short‑term residents 
to vote for the local political institutions) and a 
revision of the clé de répartition, an agreement that 
divides revenues between the three provinces.2 With a 
growing population in the capital Noumea, southern 
provincial leaders are seeking to change this existing 
agreement, because the two rural provinces currently 
receive a greater share to make up for decades of 
underdevelopment. These demands will be resisted by 
the independence movement, which calls for adherence 
to the existing provisions of the Noumea Accord. 
Key leaders of the Union Calédonienne party 
have called for the ‘full and complete implementation 
of the Accord’ and ‘nothing less than the three 
proposed referenda’ If the vote is negative in all three 
referendums, UC President Daniel Goa has called 
for bilateral negotiations between the independence 
movement and the French state to determine the way 
forward.3 The other major independence party, Parti 
de Libération Kanak (Palika or Kanak Liberation 
Party) has talked of ‘independence with partnership’, 
stressing the importance of adding content to the 
concept of New Caledonian citizenship (LNC 2017). 
Palika’s 2014 campaign slogan was Reuissions notre 
citoyenneté or ‘Let us succeed with our citizenship’.
In a 2014 interview, Palika President 
Paul Neaoutyine stated: 
New Caledonians should take up the rights and 
responsibilities of the New Caledonian citizenship 
they have adopted, as a voluntary step towards 
full emancipation, for sovereign and equal 
relations with France and the free nations of the 
world.4 
As president of the Northern Province, 
Neaoutyine also reaffirmed his opposition to 
changing the clé de repartition and stated: 
Some people are talking about a third accord. 
But what would you add in a new accord beyond 
what’s already there in the Noumea Accord? 
(Maclellan 2015:19)
Key independence leaders stress that the 
creation of a sovereign nation does not mean a final 
rupture with France. UC politician Roch Wamytan 
has offered a nuanced approach on the question 
of the five remaining sovereign powers, proposing 
the need for transitional agreements with France 
or neighbouring Pacific nations in areas such as 
maritime surveillance and national security: 
We see the future of the country within the 
realities of today, a globalised world with 
a modern economy. We are ready to sign 
cooperation agreements to help manage 
certain powers, whether with France, the 
European Union, or with countries in the 
region (LNC 2014:2).
Some Kanak leaders have begun to publicly 
discuss the type of security forces that might 
exist after independence, a crucial question 
given that the French state retains control 
of defence, policing and courts until a final 
decision on self‑determination. For example, 
Paul Neaoutyine has reflected on whether there 
is a need for an army (as in Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea) or just a paramilitary police force 
(Vanuatu or Solomon Islands) and has expressed 
a preference for the latter (Maclellan 2015:6).
There are precedents in the francophone 
world where France contributed to defence and 
security after a self‑determination referendum: 
one example is the 1962 Evian peace accord 
in Algeria, which allowed France to maintain 
its military bases in Algeria for five years after 
independence. (France even continued its nuclear 
testing programme in the Sahara desert after 
Algerian independence, with 13 underground 
nuclear tests at In Eker between 1961 and 1965.)
Economic reform and mining
Beyond this political debate, of course, 
lies the reality best expressed by the late 
Kanak leader Jean‑Marie Tjibaou: ‘The most 
important day is not the day of the referendum, 
but the day after’ (Tjibaou 1996:196).
A much wider discussion about the social, 
economic and cultural values of the future nation 
underlies the politics. One crucial area concerns 
the economic re‑equilibrage (rebalancing) that is 
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or Wallisian heritage (DNC 2018). But with 
non‑compulsory voting for roughly 170,000 
registered voters, the level of mobilisation of 
supporters in each camp — through fear or hope 
— will have a decisive impact on the result.
The Kanak people have been made a minority 
in their own country through generations of 
settlement and continuing migration (currently 
around 40 per cent of the population). For this 
reason, restrictions on voting rights are a central 
pillar of the Noumea Accord process. Nevertheless, 
a variety of conservative anti‑independence 
parties have implicitly or expressly sought to 
overturn these restrictions on voting in 2019, 
proposing that the electorate be extended again to 
all French nationals. This is a highly contentious 
issue and efforts to widen the voting body will 
be fiercely resisted by the FLNKS and its allies.
No party holds a majority in the congress 
elected in 2014, which is currently divided 
between 29 opponents of independence and 25 
pro‑independence members. But dialogue between 
supporters and opponents of independence is 
hampered by divisions within the two camps. 
The FLNKS coalition faces tensions between 
the two largest pro‑independence parties 
Union Calédonienne and Palika. There are also 
smaller parties such as the Parti Travailliste 
(Labour Party) and Dynamique Unitaire Sud 
(DUS) that support independence but are not 
part of the FLNKS. On the other side, there are 
major differences between the three leading 
anti‑independence parties, despite agreement to 
carve up key posts in the assemblies, congress 
and government under a so‑called ‘governance 
pact’. This governance pact has crumbled due 
to fundamental policy differences between the 
competing anti‑independence forces on issues 
like mining, collaboration with the independence 
parties and the future relationship with France.
In past years, the French state has presented 
itself as a neutral arbiter, accompanying the 
people of New Caledonia towards their future 
decision. This polite fiction masks the strategic 
interests of France as a mid‑sized global power. 
Any pretence at neutrality was discarded when 
French President Emmanuel Macron visited 
New Caledonia in May 2018. While claiming not 
a central pillar of the Noumea Accord. With the 
country holding nearly 25 per cent of global nickel 
reserves, the mining sector is a significant arena of 
political, economic and social conflict. Contending 
parties (including transnational corporations like 
Vale, ERAMET and Glencore) fight for control 
of New Caledonia’s nickel and other strategic 
minerals, as part of the broader political debate. 
The signing of the Noumea Accord in May 
1998 was only possible because contending parties 
had come to agreement some months earlier 
over the préalable minière (mining precondition) 
posed by the independence movement. The 
February 1998 Bercy Accord allowed the transfer 
of strategic deposits of high‑grade nickel to SMSP 
and SOFINOR, two companies controlled by 
the northern provincial administration, opening 
the way for the construction of the Koniambo 
nickel smelter in the north of the country and 
challenging the monopoly long held by the 
French‑controlled ERAMET–Société le Nickel.
Decisions made about economic policy in the 
boom times have come to haunt the government 
and provincial authorities. This key industry 
is buffeted by fluctuating prices for nickel on 
the international market, and by protests and 
disputes between industry subcontractors and 
the government. All three smelters — KNS 
Koniambo in the north, Vale’s Goro project in 
the south and the Doniambo smelter run by 
ERAMET–SLN in Noumea — face a perfect storm 
of changing international nickel prices, heavy 
debt burdens, technological failures and reduced 
capital investment by their parent companies. 
Questions over ore export markets, with the 
collapse of Clive Palmer’s QNI Yabulu operation 
in Queensland, complicate decision‑making at a 
crucial time with China now serving as a major 
destination for a range of ores and metal products. 
The fundamental dilemma is that most 
Kanaks want independence and most Europeans 
do not. While the Noumea Accord process has 
transformed New Caledonia’s economy and society, 
this core political division remains. Opinion polls 
in early 2018 suggest the independence movement 
will not win the November referendum, as the 
FLNKS has not yet made a strategic breakthrough 
to win mass support from voters of European 
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all parts of PNG, but under which Bougainville’s 
government received mineral royalties previously 
payable to the national government. 
By the mid‑to‑late 1980s, dissatisfaction 
in Bougainville had grown over the provincial 
government’s limited power to deal with mining 
impacts. From November 1988, destruction of 
mine power lines intended by the Bougainvillean 
perpetrators to force BCL and PNG to renegotiate 
the mining agreement instead prompted PNG to 
deploy security forces, which used indiscriminate 
violence against Bougainvilleans. A wider 
violent conflict emerged, with Bougainville 
independence becoming the central goal of the 
loosely structured Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army (BRA). Following the departure of PNG 
forces from Bougainville under a ceasefire in March 
1990, Bougainville announced a second unilateral 
declaration of independence in May 1990. In June 
that year, PNG imposed an air and sea blockade 
on Bougainville which operated until late 1994.
The conflict caused deep divisions amongst 
Bougainvilleans, with complex localised conflicts 
resulting in the development of pro‑PNG militias 
(Bougainville Resistance Forces, or BRF) opposing 
the BRA. At the request of local leaders suffering 
from localised conflict, PNG forces returned 
to parts of Bougainville from September 1990, 
and by 1993 they had a degree of control over 
significant parts of Bougainville. The BRA, 
however, remained in control of over half the 
province and had an extensive support base. The 
BRF likewise had extensive support and continued 
to oppose the independence demands of the BRA. 
Estimates of the deaths attributed to the 
conflict (including deaths arising from the PNG 
blockade) range from 3000 up to 20,000.6 More 
than one third of the population was displaced, 
most infrastructure and large amounts of private 
property were destroyed or severely damaged; 
the Panguna mine ceased operation in May 
1989 and remains closed as of mid‑2018. 
A peace process developed in Bougainville from 
mid‑1997, initiated by moderate Bougainvillean 
leaders on both sides, and supported from late 
1997 to mid‑2005 by an international intervention 
comprising two main elements: an unarmed 
regional monitoring body (1997–2003) and a small 
to take sides, Macron said that the referendum 
process was ‘constructing a sovereignty within a 
national sovereignty’ and that France would be 
the less without New Caledonia (Fisher 2018). 
France has territories and military deployments in 
every ocean of the world and long‑term interests 
in terrestrial and maritime resources, such as the 
seabed minerals and fisheries of the 11 million 
square kilometres of exclusive economic zones 
under French sovereignty (Maclellan 2018). 
With FLNKS leaders continuing to seek support 
from the United Nations Special Committee on 
Decolonisation, the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
and the Pacific Islands Forum, the international 
context becomes even more crucial — especially as 
the timing for New Caledonia’s political decision 
coincides with a similar debate in Bougainville.
Part 2: Bougainville — autonomy, 
independence and mining
Bougainville, currently an autonomous region 
of Papua New Guinea (PNG), comprises two 
large islands (Bougainville and Buka) and many 
smaller islands and atolls. Its population in 2018 
is approximately 300,000, less than four per 
cent of PNG’s total population, and its land area 
constitutes about two per cent of PNG territory.
From November 1988 to July 1997 Bougainville 
was wracked by violent conflict, widely referred 
to amongst Bougainvilleans as ‘the crisis’. The 
conflict originated in widespread dissatisfaction 
with the action of the Australian colonial 
government in imposing the development of the 
huge Panguna copper and gold mine from 1966 
for the benefit of the rest of the then Territory of 
Papua and New Guinea; the mine was operated 
from 1972 by Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL), 
majority owned by Conzinc Riotinto Australia.5 
The environmental and social impacts of the mine 
and unfair distribution of its ‘benefits’ caused 
particular resentment (Regan 2017). Disagreements 
between Bougainville leaders and PNG about 
the mine and its impacts contributed to an 
attempted unilateral declaration of Bougainville’s 
independence in September 1975, after which 
the dispute was settled by PNG amending its 
constitution to provide for a decentralised 
system of provincial governments applicable to 
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arrangements for the conduct of the referendum. 
The bulk of the constitutionalised arrangements, 
however, deal with the establishment and operation 
of special autonomy arrangements for Bougainville. 
The goal of demilitarisation of Bougainville 
was pursued through significant incentives for 
the BRA and BRF to dispose of their firearms. 
The focus on weapons came because the 
constitutional laws provided that its provisions 
did not come into operation, even after the PNG 
parliament enacted them, unless the head of the 
UN mission in Bougainville certified completion 
of the second stage of a three‑stage ‘weapons 
disposal’ process provided for by the BPA.
The autonomy arrangements are unique to 
Bougainville and are dramatically different to the 
arrangements for provincial governments which 
operate in most of the rest of PNG. They enable 
Bougainville to use a constitutional commission 
and a constituent assembly to develop its own 
constitution, providing for the structures and 
key processes of the Autonomous Bougainville 
Government (ABG). The ABG was vested with all 
the powers and functions of the previous North 
Solomons Provincial Government (NSPG)7, and 
in addition, a long list of 56 additional powers 
and functions was made available to the ABG 
under a transfer process. This process gave the 
ABG a right to have powers transferred to it 
after giving 12 months notice and negotiating 
the financial and capacity arrangements needed 
for the effective ABG exercise of the powers and 
functions in question. The 56‑item list includes 
many significant responsibilities such as land 
and natural resources, mining, water resources 
and environment. In addition to that list, the 
ABG has authority to establish a wide range of 
institutions, including its own public service, 
courts to an equivalent level of the PNG national 
court, a police service and an ombudsman. A 
list of 17 powers in relation to Bougainville 
is retained by the national government, such 
as currency, defence and foreign affairs. 
The autonomy arrangements include provisions 
on intergovernmental arrangements and on 
protection of the constitutional arrangements for 
unilateral change by the national government. 
On intergovernmental arrangements, the 
United Nations political office (1998–2005). The 
need to build trust between the deeply divided 
parties meant that negotiations for a political 
settlement did not begin until mid‑1999. Prior 
to these negotiations, the opposing Bougainville 
factions negotiated a common negotiating position 
(Regan 2002). On the question of Bougainville 
independence, the pro‑independence leadership 
compromised by abandoning their favoured 
demand for immediate independence, instead 
seeking a binding referendum on independence 
within a few years, with constitutionally 
guaranteed autonomy operating in the interim. 
In late 2000 a stalemate in negotiations on the 
referendum was resolved by an intervention of 
the then Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Alexander Downer. He proposed a non‑binding 
referendum, deferred for 10 to 15 years after 
the establishment of autonomy in Bougainville 
(Downer 2001:33–34; Regan 2010:88–90). 
Downer gained support from the Bougainville 
negotiators for a non‑binding referendum by 
pointing to East Timor’s non‑binding referendum 
in 1998, saying that once East Timorese 
voted overwhelmingly for independence, the 
international community ensured that the 
outcome was honoured. To the PNG side, he 
advised that if the result was not binding, then 
its sovereignty was protected. Thus, both sides 
were persuaded that the international community 
would support their favoured position following 
a ‘yes’ vote in an independence referendum.
The Bougainville Peace Agreement
The long and detailed Bougainville Peace 
Agreement (BPA) was signed on 30 August 2001. 
PNG constitutional laws giving legal effect to 
most provisions of the agreement, inclusive of 
the referendum arrangements, were passed by the 
PNG parliament early in 2002. Those laws were a 
new part XIV of the PNG constitution, and a new 
organic law, the Organic Law on Peace‑building 
in Bougainville — Autonomous Bougainville 
Government and Bougainville Referendum (the 
Organic Law). Because of Bougainville concerns 
about the necessity to constitutionalise as much of 
the agreed arrangements as possible, the Organic 
Law contains a 65‑page schedule on detailed 
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Most details about the actual conduct of 
the referendum are contained in the 65‑page 
schedule to the Organic Law. All residents of 
Bougainville entitled to enrol to vote in national 
parliament elections will be entitled to vote, as 
will ‘non‑resident’ Bougainvilleans, for whom 
the connections to Bougainville required for 
enrolment were agreed by the two governments 
at a JSB meeting in late June 2018. After the 
referendum, section 342 of the PNG constitution 
requires the two governments to consult on the 
results. Then ‘subject to’ that consultation, the 
results will be tabled in the national parliament, 
the BPA providing that the outcome is then ‘subject 
to ratification (final decision‑making) of the 
national parliament’ (para. 311(a)). Accordingly, 
while most of the detailed arrangements for 
the referendum are contained in the Organic 
Law schedule, significant issues are left to 
negotiation between the governments at a later 
date, and as yet remain to be negotiated.
The question or questions to be asked
The constitutional laws and the BPA leave open the 
issue of the content of the ‘question or questions 
to be put’ in the referendum’ (constitution 
section 339). In general terms, the referendum is 
intended to be about ‘the future political status 
of Bougainville’ (section 338). However, the only 
option amongst potential future political statuses 
that must be included is ‘separate independence 
for Bougainville’ (section 339(c)). The ABG put 
forward a proposal to the December 2017 and 
the June 2018 JSB meetings to the effect that 
the question should be one offering a simple 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the option of independence, but a 
decision on the question was deferred to a later 
JSB meeting. In practice, a question in the form 
proposed by the ABG would involve a choice 
between independence, on the one hand, and 
autonomy on the other, with a ‘no’ vote effectively 
serving as a vote for autonomy. In the absence of 
a change to Bougainville’s political status being 
agreed to by the national parliament, the existing 
autonomy arrangements will continue to apply to 
Bougainville. At the June JSB meeting the national 
government requested deferral of discussion of 
the question to a special JSB to be held before the 
PNG constitution provides that the national 
government ‘has no power to withdraw powers 
from the Bougainville Government or to suspend 
it’ (section 331(c)). It also provides a multiple 
stage process for dealing with disputes between 
the two governments (sections 333 to 336), 
inclusive of disputes in relation to the referendum 
process (section 343). Provision is included for 
establishing and operating a Joint Supervisory 
Body (JSB) that oversees the implementation of 
the BPA and acts as a consultative forum between 
the two governments (section 332). In relation 
to protection of the constitutional arrangements, 
the PNG constitution provides that neither part 
XIV of the constitution nor the Organic Law, 
inclusive of the provisions on the referendum, can 
be amended without the approval of the proposed 
amendment by a two‑thirds absolute majority 
vote by the Bougainville legislature (section 345).
Financial aspects of autonomy provide 
for the PNG government to support the ABG 
through two main annual grants. One meets the 
cost of the functions of the ABG, inclusive of 
provision to meet the costs of newly transferred 
powers and functions once the transfer process is 
complete. The other is a grant to meet the costs 
of restoration and development of post‑conflict 
Bougainville. The autonomy arrangements 
offered the PNG government the opportunity 
to make the autonomy status so attractive to 
Bougainville that even pro‑secessionists might 
be persuaded to vote for continued autonomy 
when the referendum was held. However, 
PNG has failed to pay the Restoration and 
Development Grant as required by the Organic 
Law. Further, the process of transfer of powers 
to the ABG has been far slower than expected.
As to the referendum, the BPA specifies that 
a referendum on the future political status of 
Bougainville be held before mid‑June 2020, in 
which the question or questions will be agreed 
by the two governments, provided that one of 
the options offered will be independence for 
Bougainville. The date of the referendum is to 
be agreed by the two governments, and must 
be between the tenth and fifteenth anniversary 
of the establishment of the ABG, that is in the 
‘window’ between June 2015 and June 2020. 
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referendum would still need to be held before 
mid‑June 2020, but could not be held earlier. 
No provision is made for a method to 
determine whether weapons have been disposed 
of in accordance with the Agreement, mainly 
because the BPA provided for the UN to make 
determinations about whether weapons had been 
disposed of in accordance with the three‑stage 
weapons disposal process, and a determination 
to that effect was made in May 2005, just before 
the first ABG election. Despite this, there is 
widespread agreement amongst the Bougainville 
leadership, including the leadership of former 
combatant groups, that there remains a need for 
disposal of the many weapons still held by groups 
that were outside the peace process and so did not 
take part in the weapons disposal program that 
ended in 2005. As a result, in practice, weapons 
disposal can be expected to be a factor taken 
into account in setting the referendum date.
The fundamental misunderstanding about these 
provisions concerns whether weapons disposal 
and good governance constitute preconditions that 
must be met by Bougainville before the referendum 
can be held or whether they are matters to be 
taken into account when setting the date in the 
five‑year window. Views to this effect have been 
advanced a number of times by the PNG Prime 
Minister (The National 5/3/2018; PNG Post Courier 
8/3/2018, 3/5/2018), by academic commentators 
(for example, Wallis 2012:37) and by a report of 
the PNG Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on 
Bougainville Affairs (PNG Parliament 2017:16). 
These views are clearly contrary to both the 
PNG constitution and the BPA which respectively 
and explicitly make clear that the provision for the 
five‑year window within which the referendum 
must be held apply irrespective of any other 
consideration. Thus the constitution provides 
that those provisions apply ‘notwithstanding any 
other provision’ [emphasis added] (sub‑section 
338(2)), while the BPA provides that the 
‘referendum will be held no earlier than 10 years, 
and, in any case, no later than 15 years after the 
election of the first autonomous Bougainville 
Government’ [emphasis added] (para. 312(a)).
The reasons for the misunderstanding include 
the elapse of 17 years and the holding of four 
end of July 2018, and requested joint legal advice 
from lawyers for both governments on unspecified 
constitutional issues concerning the question 
or questions. At the time of writing (late July), 
the joint legal advice had not been developed, 
and no date had been set for the special JSB. 
The issue remains to be determined through 
consultation. Statements by PNG Prime 
Minister Peter O’Neill to the effect that there is 
no requirements that the referendum be about 
independence (PNG Post Courier 3/3/2018; The 
National 3/5/2018) have caused concern that 
there may be difficulties in the consultations.
Timing of the Bougainville referendum
The provisions of the BPA and the PNG 
constitution on the timing of the referendum 
have become the subject of controversy, even 
though they are quite clear, requiring that it 
must be held in the five‑year window between 
the tenth and the fifteenth anniversary of the 
establishment of the ABG. The problems arise 
because of fundamental misunderstandings about 
provisions in the BPA and the PNG constitution 
that the two governments are required to take 
into account when setting the date within the 
five‑year window. Those matters are whether 
‘weapons have been disposed of in accordance 
with the agreement [the BPA]’, and whether 
‘it has been determined that the Bougainville 
government has been and is being conducted 
in accordance with internationally accepted 
standards of good governance’ (section 338(3)). 
The constitution provides for the good 
governance issue to be determined by the five 
yearly process for review of the autonomy 
arrangements (section 337) and — if necessary 
— the process that the constitution provides for 
resolution of disputes between the governments 
(sections 332–336). There has so far been one 
review, in 2014, and at the June 2018 JSB meeting 
it was agreed a second one should be conducted 
by UN‑funded experts in the second half of 2018, 
with a report expected by the end of October 2018. 
If for any reason the review does not occur, then 
the governments would not be able to meet the 
requirement for taking good governance issues 
into account. The outcome would be that the 
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vote in the referendum. However, this aspect 
of the BPA was the subject of clear agreement 
between the parties to the negotiation of the BPA. 
In relation to non‑resident Bougainvilleans, 
the 2011 PNG census recorded almost 10,000 
people who were both born in Bougainville 
and resident outside the Autonomous Region 
of Bougainville (although that figure probably 
includes some who were not ‘indigenous’ 
Bougainvilleans and does not include many 
‘indigenous’ Bougainvilleans born outside 
Bougainville). The Organic Law (section 55(1)) 
elaborates on the BPA (para. 315) to state that, 
before the date of the referendum is agreed by the 
governments, they must consult and agree on the:
detailed criteria to determine the link or links 
with Bougainville that a person (referred 
to in the Agreement as a “non‑resident 
Bougainvillean”) must have in order to be 
entitled to vote at the Referendum.
At the JSB meeting held in Arawa on 29 June 
2018, the two governments agreed to the criteria for 
enrolment of non‑resident Bougainvilleans. They 
must meet the requirements of section 7 of the 
Bougainville constitution, under which a person is 
a Bougainvillean if he or she is a member of a clan 
lineage that owns land by custom in Bougainville, 
has been adopted into such a clan, is married to 
or is the child of a person who is a member of 
a clan owning land by custom in Bougainville. 
Further, it was agreed that a person must be 
entitled to register to vote in a PNG national 
election, which means they must be a citizen of 
PNG, over 18 years of age, and resident in PNG. 
The schedule to the Organic Law makes 
it mandatory for people to enrol to vote in 
the referendum, but voting is not compulsory. 
There are no provisions setting a quorum 
for either voter turnout or results. It will be a 
matter for the two governments to take into 
account the numbers voting for whatever 
options are put forward in the question or 
questions to be asked in the referendum.
The conduct of the referendum
The BPA and the Organic Law provide for the 
electoral authorities of both governments to 
general elections for the national parliament since 
the BPA was signed. All those on the national 
government side of the original negotiations are 
no longer being involved in BPA implementation. 
Should the national government continue to hold 
the position that weapons disposal and good 
governance are preconditions for the referendum 
to take place, it is likely that the ABG will seek to 
deal with the issue through the dispute settlement 
process, that is, to have the matter dealt with 
by the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea as 
a question of constitutional interpretation.
The currently proposed date for the 
referendum in June 2019 was agreed by the two 
governments at the May 2016 JSB as a ‘target 
date’ for planning purposes only. However, it has 
since become widely accepted in Bougainville as 
the actual date. In fact, under the BPA and the 
national constitution the actual date cannot be 
agreed until the two governments consult over 
whether good governance has been and is being 
achieved by the ABG. In practice it will also be 
necessary to take into account the progress made 
in establishing the Bougainville Referendum 
Commission (BRC) and in making necessary 
preparations, such as compiling the rolls for voters. 
Most of the work of the BRC depends on 
availability of funds. At the time of writing, 
a promised initial national government 
contribution of K20 million to the BRC has not 
been released, resulting in growing uncertainty 
about the timetable for preparatory activities 
for the referendum. At present it seems most 
unlikely that the state of preparations would 
allow the referendum to be held on the target 
date. It is more likely it will be held closer to 
the final permissible date of June 2020.
The electoral roll
Both the BPA and the Organic Law provide that 
persons resident in Bougainville can enrol to 
vote in the referendum subject only to having 
been resident for six months. Thus it is clear 
that non‑Bougainvillean citizens of PNG who 
meet the residential requirements are entitled 
to enrol. This is a provision that causes some 
controversy in Bougainville, where many believe 
that only Bougainvilleans should be entitled to 
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of the United Nations Development Program or 
UNDP). Prime Minister Peter O’Neill indicated 
that the national government was considering 
nominating former Irish prime minister Bertie 
Ahern. The JSB meeting delegated authority 
to appoint the chair to Prime Minister O’Neill 
and President Momis and at a meeting between 
them in April 2018, the pair reached agreement 
to jointly invite Mr Ahern to take up the role. 
Mr Ahern subsequently accepted the invitation 
(Dineen 2018). The ABG decided to accept the 
national government’s nominee because not 
only was Ahern a suitably qualified person, but 
also because accepting the national government 
nominee would be likely to encourage the national 
government to take ownership of the BRC and 
of the referendum process more generally. 
In part because of limited capacity and financial 
resources in both the PNG national government 
and the ABG, the international community is 
playing significant roles in provision of both 
funding and expertise. The UN Peacebuilding 
Fund and the UNDP are prominent, and the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
is providing significant technical support.
Will the referendum be delayed?
The existence of the misunderstanding about 
whether weapons disposal and good governance 
are preconditions that must be met before 
the referendum is held (outlined above) gives 
rise to the serious possibility that the national 
government might take the view that the 
referendum should not be held in the five‑year 
window of 2015 to 2020. While misunderstanding 
of the BPA and constitutional provisions is 
a factor in the national government view on 
preconditions, there is also little doubt that it 
suits the national government to take that view. 
Key figures in the national government have 
deep concerns about the threat to national unity 
presented by a referendum on independence. 
Fears about the possible independence of 
Bougainville also feed wider fears that this will 
be a precedent for other parts of the country. 
Such concerns were first in evidence before PNG 
independence in 1975, when there were a number 
of micro‑nationalist movements in various parts 
cooperate in the conduct of the referendum. 
However the Organic Law offers the options 
of doing that through the establishment of an 
independent body, or alternatively leaving the 
responsibility with either or both of the electoral 
authorities. At a JSB meeting in May 2016, the 
governments agreed to establish an independent 
body, to be called the Bougainville Referendum 
Commission (BRC). In August 2017, the charter 
establishing the BRC was signed by the PNG 
Governor‑General. It provided for a seven‑member 
commission headed by an independent person 
appointed by the two governments, the heads 
of the two government’s electoral authorities, 
and two members each appointed by both 
governments, with the requirement that one each 
of those two members should be a woman. 
It was expected that it might take some time 
for the two governments to agree on a chair and 
nominate their appointees. In the interim, the 
charter provides for the commission to operate 
through a Transitional Committee, made up 
of the heads of the two governments’ electoral 
authorities together with the chief secretaries 
to the two governments. At the time of writing 
(June 2018), the Transitional Committee had 
met six times. Working committees established 
at its first meeting (December 2017) have 
enabled the BRC to make considerable progress 
towards planning of the referendum. 
The main stumbling block remains funding. 
The indicative budget developed by the BRC 
indicates the total budget for the referendum 
will be around K127 million (about AU$51 
million). However as yet only K500,000 allocated 
by the ABG is available, while K20 million 
promised by the national government towards 
meeting 2018 costs has yet to be released. At 
the time of writing, there is growing concern 
that delays in the release of PNG funds are 
already pushing back important preparatory 
steps, such as the compilation of voter rolls.
From the time the BRC was established, there 
was discussion amongst key actors of the need 
for the chair of the new body to be a respected 
international figure. At the JSB meeting in 
December 2017, the ABG proposed Helen Clark 
(former prime minister of New Zealand and head 
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to create anxiety among our people. We must 
make sure that this is a realistic outcome 
that will happen in our country. So it must 
be discussed in a frank and open manner so 
that we are not going to build the hopes and 
aspirations of the people of Bougainville to a 
degree where when the Parliament does not 
ratify the outcome, people of Bougainville 
feel that they are being let down (PNG Post 
Courier 13/4/2018). 
On more than one occasion, he has 
stated that he expects that every MP will vote 
against independence when the referendum 
outcome is discussed in parliament. 
For example, in May 2018 he said: 
After the vote in 2019, regardless of the 
question — the outcome must be tabled in 
Parliament … I can assure you that every 
Member of Parliament will vote in the 
interests of a unified and harmonious country 
(PNG Post Courier 3/5/2018).
Economic development and  mining
Quite apart from the attitude of the Prime 
Minister, there are other significant obstacles 
to Bougainville’s independence. A key difficulty 
is whether Bougainville can achieve the fiscal 
self‑reliance likely to be necessary for independence 
to be a reality. In 2017, total budgeted expenditure 
for the ABG was K162 million. ABG ‘internal’ 
revenue (inclusive of personal income tax derived 
from Bougainville remitted to the ABG by the 
PNG Internal Revenue Commission) was only 
K21 million, or 13 per cent of the total budget 
(Chand 2017). The rest of the revenue was derived 
from national government grants. Satish Chand 
has undertaken comparisons with other small 
Pacific states, notably Vanuatu (which has a similar 
population to Bougainville) and Solomon Islands, 
estimating that an independent Bougainville 
would need an annual budget of between K836 
million and K923 million (Chand 2017).
Bougainville’s current economy is based 
heavily on smallholder cocoa and alluvial gold 
production, each generating in the region of K75 
to K100 million per year for Bougainvilleans 
(O’Faircheallaigh, Regan and Kenema 2017). 
of the country (May 1982). There are particular 
fears in contemporary Bougainville that the 
resource‑rich parts of PNG could be candidates 
for separation. In March 2018, Prime Minister 
O’Neill said in relation to Bougainville that ‘we 
worry about the unity of our country. We can’t have 
every resource‑rich province secede from PNG. It 
is just unthinkable’ (The National 5/3/2018). Since 
the BPA was signed in 2001, every PNG Prime 
Minister has probably had concerns about not 
wanting to go down in history as the person who 
presided over the breakup of the country. Thus, 
on the fortieth anniversary of PNG independence 
on 15 September 2015, Prime Minister O’Neill 
was reported as stressing that PNG would ‘not 
be broken up under his watch’ (Callick 2015).
O’Neill, who has been Prime Minister since 
mid‑2011, has spoken more about the Bougainville 
referendum than any other national government 
figure, and has done so particularly in the first 
half of 2018. To some extent there are mixed 
messages here. On the one hand he has stated on 
several occasions that the national government is 
committed to complete implementation of the BPA 
provisions on the referendum (PNG Post Courier 
8/3/2018). On the other hand he has also claimed 
on several occasions that weapons disposal and 
good governance are preconditions or prerequisites 
for the referendum to be held (The National 
5/3/2018; Australian Associated Press 1/5/2018). 
In addition, O’Neill has apparently mounted 
a campaign to encourage the national parliament 
to take a stand against independence. In 
September 2015, he emphasised that the question 
of independence was ultimately a matter for the 
parliament, which ‘would consider the question 
with great seriousness, with the backdrop of our 
understanding of the country. We have a diverse 
and tribal country, so we can ask ourselves, where 
does it stop?’ (Callick 2015). In March 2018 he 
said ‘any outcome of the referendum will have to 
be endorsed by Parliament, which basically means 
that the people of Bougainville will also [have to] 
convince the people of PNG as well through their 
elected leaders’ (PNG Post Courier 10/3/2018). 
In April 2018 O’Neill told the parliament: 
If this Parliament does not ratify the 
outcomes of the referendum, we don’t want 
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because current public sector capacity and fiscal 
self‑reliance prospects are weak) or a change 
to even greater autonomy for Bougainville. 
In 2018, the Bougainville leadership has been 
exposed to the South Sudanese experience, and 
has taken away the need to plan carefully for the 
period after the referendum in order to avoid 
post‑referendum violence. In a paper prepared 
for the June 2018 JSB meeting, the ABG proposed 
and the national government agreed to establish 
a joint ABG–national government taskforce to 
undertake planning for the post‑referendum 
situation, and also proposed a summit meeting 
in late 2018 to consider the issues involved.
Part 3: Self‑determination in Melanesia?
By coincidence of timing, the self‑determination 
processes in New Caledonia and Bougainville 
are moving towards a new political status 
in the same period. There are significant 
differences in the two cases, in international 
law, colonial history and socio‑economic status. 
With France as administering power, New 
Caledonia is listed as a non–self governing 
territory with the UN General Assembly and 
is monitored by the UN Special Committee 
on Decolonisation. In contrast, Bougainville 
is part of the postcolonial nation of PNG. 
There are, however, important similarities 
in the situations of the two Melanesian 
nations, which have important implications for 
neighbours like Australia, New Zealand and the 
island members of the PIF and the MSG. This 
section briefly outlines eight areas where there 
are commonalities and contrasts between the 
transition in Bougainville and New Caledonia:
1. Brokering peace
The Noumea Accord model of a deferred 
referendum and a lengthy transitional process 
directly influenced peace brokering in both 
Bougainville and Timor‑Leste in the late 1990s. 
Negotiators between different Bougainvillean 
groupings used the Noumea Accord as a model. 
In 1999, then Australian Prime Minister John 
Howard wrote to then Indonesian President 
Habibie proposing a similar decade‑long transition 
for Timor‑Leste. The Indonesian government 
decided instead to proceed directly to a referendum 
Taxing either industry would be difficult and 
unlikely to raise more than a few million kina 
at best. The only other likely significant source 
of revenue would be licence fees for fishing for 
migratory fish stocks in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone associated with Bougainville, which could 
possibly amount to K100 million per year.
Since the ABG was established, successive 
leadership groups have regarded the most likely 
source of revenues to make independence viable 
to be large‑scale mining. This could involve either 
reopening the Panguna mine (which has about 
20 years of proven resource still in the ground), 
or both Panguna and new mines that may be 
established by other operators that were issued 
with exploration licences in 2017 for three areas 
of Bougainville. Putting aside risks such as Dutch 
disease (Chand 2017:10) and the difficulties that 
can be expected in achieving consensus on renewed 
large‑scale mining (Regan 2017), it will take some 
time to either reopen Panguna or develop any new 
mines. Estimates range from six to eight years 
for reopening Panguna, and 15 years or more 
for a new mine (from exploration to operation). 
Hence, large‑scale mining will not result in the 
necessary revenue for a self‑reliant Bougainville 
to be available soon after the referendum. 
It should be noted that renewal of large‑scale 
mining is far from assured, in large part because of 
the divisiveness it generates. Parts of the population 
are opposed to mining in principle. There is also 
potential division amongst landowners, caused 
by foreign companies seeking access to resources 
by developing allies amongst local landowner 
groups. This has occurred in relation to Panguna, 
leading the ABG in early in 2018 to impose a 
moratorium on exploration and development there.
Post‑referendum transition
There is a growing focus amongst the Bougainville 
leadership on the period following the referendum, 
which is often referred to as ‘the transition period’. 
The expectation is that whatever the outcome 
of the referendum, the two governments will 
consult about the outcome. Such consultations 
are expected to deal with the possibility of 
change to Bougainville’s political status, be 
that a gradual change to independence (largely 
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people have created a different dynamic to 
the overwhelmingly Melanesian population 
of Bougainville. The Noumea Accord 
includes the central principle of uniting a 
multicultural, multiethnic society in a common 
destiny (le destin commun) by creating a new 
citizenship for long‑term residents, even as 
the ‘Kanak people’ is recognised for the first 
time ever in French constitutional law (as 
a people, not a minority ethnic group).
In both cases, the upheaval of armed conflict 
has allowed a period of post‑conflict reflection 
on whether existing systems of governance, law, 
administration and bureaucracy are best suited 
to the local context. There have been innovative 
debates about the role of culture and customary 
leadership, including constitutionally endorsed 
provisions for the creation of a Kanak customary 
senate in New Caledonia and a Bougainville 
advisory body of traditional chiefs and other 
traditional leaders (yet to be established). These 
are both envisaged as advisory structures to the 
government and legislature. New Caledonia has 
also started to transform its educational curriculum 
and health system to better reflect local realities.
Women have also used this period of 
political reform to advance their call for greater 
representation in the parliament and public 
sphere. This is most evident in New Caledonia 
and other French territories, where France’s 
parity law has ensured equal representation of 
women on electoral lists and a massive growth 
in the numbers of elected female representatives 
(women make up 46 per cent of the congress 
elected in 2014, the mayor of Noumea is currently 
a woman, and two women have served as 
President of the Government of New Caledonia 
since 2007). In a smaller way, Bougainville has 
created three seats for women in the autonomous 
government, as a small contribution to carrying 
dynamic women’s organisation in the church and 
community sector into the parliamentary sphere.
3. Relations with the metropole
In both Bougainville and New Caledonia, the 
social economic and political crisis combines 
internal and external dynamics, as tensions 
with the metropolitan capital (Paris or Port 
Moresby) overlay a range of local, domestic 
on self‑determination, offended by the implicit 
comparison between the Indonesian annexation 
of Timor and the long history of European 
colonialism in the Pacific. However Timorese 
voted overwhelmingly for independence, following 
extensive bloodshed as military‑backed militias 
committed significant human rights violations.
Rather than proceeding directly to a 
referendum on self‑determination in 1988, the 
Matignon‑Outinot Agreements delayed a vote 
by 10 years. The 1998 Noumea Accord mapped 
out a further 20‑year transition before a final 
decision on New Caledonia’s political status would 
be determined. In Bougainville, the creation 
of the Autonomous Bougainville Government 
preceded a 10‑ to 15‑year transition after 2005.
In both New Caledonia and Bougainville, the 
decision to hold a lengthy transition towards a 
final political decision was based on the belief that 
time would contribute to reconciliation between 
competing cultural and political forces after a 
period of conflict, avoiding a return to armed 
violence if the referendum went the ‘wrong’ way. 
There was also the tacit assumption on both 
sides that time would be advantageous for their 
case, changing the political or demographic 
balance before a referendum. For the State parties, 
the assumption was that better investment and 
political engagement would make it harder 
for citizens to make the final break towards 
independence. However, unlike France, PNG has 
failed to provide the financial inputs and seize 
the opportunity to make autonomy attractive 
to Bougainvillean supporters of secession.
2. Post‑conflict reconciliation
A central element for political cooperation 
is a range of efforts to promote post‑conflict 
reconciliation (Maclellan 2005). In the early stages 
of the Bougainville peace process, there were steady 
but uneven efforts to disarm combatants, reduce 
the availability of weapons in the community and 
promote truth and reconciliation for communities 
and families devastated by the conflict of the 
1990s. This disarmament process has faltered 
in recent years and the weapons required for a 
return to armed conflict are still widely available.
New Caledonia’s colonial history and 
the minority status of the indigenous Kanak 
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law in March 1999 ensured that the provisions of 
the political agreement could not be overturned 
following a change of government in Paris. In 
Bougainville too, changes were required to the 
PNG constitutional laws and the ABG has a 
veto over changes to the relevant provisions.
Both agreements include provisions on the 
irreversibility of the transfer of powers. In New 
Caledonia, a negative decision in a referendum 
on independence does not change the status 
quo ante, ensuring that the penultimate status of 
expanded autonomy cannot be rolled back. In 
Bougainville, the ABG can decide to revert powers 
to the Government of Papua New Guinea, but 
Port Moresby does not have the right to reclaim 
authority already granted to Bougainville.
5. Mining and natural resources
Underlying the conflict in Bougainville and 
New Caledonia are broader questions of 
political economy, environmental management 
and the role of transnational corporations 
in the exploitation of natural resources. 
Mining lies at the heart of the political 
economy of the two territories, both as a 
source of grievance and as a source of potential 
economic viability for a postcolonial nation. In 
New Caledonia, a central pillar of the Noumea 
Accord and decolonisation process is economic 
‘rebalancing’, with the development of a new nickel 
smelter in the Northern Province as a pillar of 
economic development in a largely agricultural, 
rural area. The decision on Bougainville’s future 
will be largely determined by the debate on 
the reopening of the Panguna mine and new 
mineral projects around the mainland.
In both Melanesian nations, there are 
extensive debates about the potential economic 
and employment benefits to be gained from 
local control of natural resources, but also a 
widespread critique of environmental damage 
and inequities in the distribution of benefits 
from major mining and resource projects. 
In both cases, transnational corporations 
are stakeholders and players in the political 
process (ERAMET, Vale and Glencore in New 
Caledonia; Bougainville Copper Ltd and Rio 
Tinto in Bougainville). The 2016 transfer from 
Rio Tinto of its shareholding in BCL to both the 
disputes between competing political forces.
In both cases, the two metropolitan 
governments pledged to fund the transfer of 
powers to the local government and administration 
as a central part of the transition. This is the 
fundamental disparity between France and PNG: 
as a wealthy OECD nation, France has funded the 
Noumea Accord process comprehensively, with 
extensive spending on infrastructure, technical 
assistance and the mechanics of implementing 
the Accord itself. In contrast, Port Moresby has 
relatively few financial and technical resources 
and much less political will in strengthening 
the Autonomous Bougainville Government.
The resulting viability of state institutions 
is sharply different. An independent New 
Caledonia would be one of the wealthiest 
Pacific Island countries, with a well‑established 
state and functioning administration. In 
contrast, Bougainville would continue with a 
tradition of weak Melanesian governance in a 
post‑referendum environment, even though 
there is a vibrant and ongoing culture of 
customary governance that has largely survived 
the turmoil of the conflict in the 1990s.
There are significant imbalances in the 
transfers to New Caledonia, however, with large 
amounts allocated to French public servants and 
institutions; for example in 2014, the French state 
allocated 36.9 billion Pacific francs (CFP) for 
defence and the army, another CFP12.1 billion for 
public order and the police, and CFP10.2 billion 
in retirement provisions for state functionaries. In 
comparison, the state transferred CFP15.6 billion 
for the three provinces and CFP11.8 billion for 
municipal government (Maclellan 2016:15). New 
Caledonia is a starkly unequal society, generating 
significant social and industrial conflict between 
poorer Kanaks and islanders and those in power.
4. Constitutional embedding of the political 
agreement
The success of the Noumea Accord, in contrast 
to previous proposals for a political settlement 
since the 1970s, was in part due to the way that 
the agreement was constitutionally entrenched 
following a popular referendum in November 
1998. The creation of a special section in the 
French constitution and the passage of an organic 
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responsible for updating the electoral rolls in 
2017–18, while France has invited a mission of 
the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation 
to observe the referendum on 4 November. 
7. Monitoring the Accord
In both cases, the agreements involve a 
staged process with regularly scheduled 
elections, mechanisms to allow monitoring 
and decision points to possibly defer key 
provisions of the Accord, as well as other 
mechanisms to promote cooperation and 
collaboration between divided parties.
On paper, both agreements establish structures 
to monitor the implementation of the Accord 
and the peacebuilding process. For Bougainville, 
the main monitoring mechanism (the JSB) has 
played an important role in decision‑making on 
the referendum. It is likely to be the main body 
in which negotiations occur between the two 
governments on the remaining issues to be resolved 
about the referendum (including the question 
to be asked and the date of the referendum). 
The New Caledonia Comité des signataires 
(Committee of Signatories to the Noumea 
Accord) has met regularly to monitor and debate 
the progress on the staged transfer of powers 
from Paris to Noumea. France has also deployed 
senior officials and politicians to promote 
debate about contentious issues, though their 
neutrality has been questioned by both sides.
Over time, the Comité des signataires has been 
expanded to include key political parties that 
were not originally signatories to the Noumea 
Accord but have developed a key role in local 
governance. The 2010 committee established 
three working groups to discuss crucial elements 
of the exit from the Noumea Accord: a balance 
sheet on the transfer of powers; a committee to 
look at options for the referendum after 2014; 
and an expert review of the future of the nickel 
industry. Key decisions on the electoral roll and 
timing of the November 2018 referendum have 
been made during face‑to‑face negotiations 
at the committee, after the full congress of 
New Caledonia failed to reach consensus. 
PNG government and the ABG has reopened 
debate on the future of Panguna and the cost of 
rehabilitating the environment (Regan 2017).
6. International scrutiny
During their respective periods of conflict, the 
independence movements in Bougainville and 
New Caledonia both sought to internationalise 
the conflict, seeking material and political 
support from overseas. They attempted to utilise 
United Nations and other international human 
rights mechanisms to publicise their cause and 
pressure the French and PNG governments. In 
both cases, church, women’s and non‑government 
agencies played a significant role in advocacy, 
lobbying or provision of logistic support.
Beyond this broad principle, however, 
there were differing levels of engagement with 
key institutions such as the United Nations, 
the Pacific Islands Forum and the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group. The FLNKS drew on regional 
support in its efforts to be relisted on the United 
Nations list of non–self governing territories 
through a UN General Assembly resolution in 
December 1986. From that time, the FLNKS has 
continued to utilise the UN Special Committee 
on Decolonisation as a tribunal to advance its 
agenda, and has more closely integrated into the 
MSG (the independence movement, rather than 
the elected government of New Caledonia, is 
the official member of the Melanesian group). 
In contrast, Bougainville has not been 
included on the MSG agenda and the forum 
played a very limited role in the peace process. 
Because Bougainville is not listed with the UN 
Special Committee on Decolonisation, UN 
principles and practice on decolonisation has 
not paralleled New Caledonia. In contrast, 
UN agencies have played a much more active 
role on the ground in Bougainville, with 
UN agencies active after 1998 and UNDP 
playing an important role in reconciliation 
and rebuilding efforts. The UN Peacebuilding 
Commission is currently investigating a potential 
role in the lead‑up to the referendum.
It is only now, with the New Caledonia 
referendum looming, that the UN is playing 
a more public role there. UN observers have 
monitored the administrative commissions 
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leadership should not concentrate solely on 
the referendum, but rather must consider 
and plan for the post‑referendum situation, 
with a view to ensuring that what they term 
as the ‘transition period’ will be peaceful.
French leaders too are emphasising dialogue 
to focus on ‘the day after’ the referendum. New 
Caledonia’s decision will affect other French 
dependencies in the Pacific that do not have 
a pathway to self‑determination. Aside from 
this point, key functions of the French state 
in Wallis and Futuna are managed through 
Noumea, which will complicate any movement 
towards New Caledonian sovereignty.
Just a few years ago, it seemed uncertain 
whether the two referendums would actually be 
held. Now, in New Caledonia, the first referendum 
will be held on schedule on 4 November 2018. The 
Bougainville situation might seem less certain, 
given some of the conflicting statements made by 
PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill in the first half 
of 2018 (he makes statements about the referendum 
not being about independence and talks of weapons 
disposal and good governance being preconditions 
for the referendum, yet he has also stated that 
the PNG national government will honour 
every word in the BPA and that the referendum 
will be held on the target date of mid‑2019).
There is extensive international community 
involvement in the preparations for the 
Bougainville referendum, including the pending 
appointment of former Irish prime minister Bertie 
Ahern as the chair of the BRC. This international 
participation points to possible diplomatic 
problems for the PNG national government should 
it seek to delay the referendum. Australia is a key 
development partner, but its role is affected by 
the fact that a large number of Bougainvilleans 
see Australia as partly responsible for the conflict 
during the 1990s — through the mine, through 
military and diplomatic support for PNG, and 
through the influence of Bougainville Copper Ltd.
The Pacific Islands Forum also faces 
complex problems in relation to the three French 
dependencies. All three hold a different legal and 
constitutional status within the French republic. 
The Noumea Accord, entrenched within the French 
constitution, creates a clear, binding pathway 
8. Abandoning the agreed process?
For members of the independence movements in 
Bougainville and New Caledonia, the decision to 
accept a lengthy transition on self‑determination 
does not negate the desire to gain the status of 
an independent and sovereign nation. However 
in both cases, there are powerful forces — 
institutions of the state in Port Moresby and 
Paris and also competing political forces on 
the ground — who are seeking to transform 
or derail the path agreed some years ago.
In New Caledonia, the minority status of 
the indigenous Kanak people and the presence 
of long‑term and recent migrants from Europe, 
Wallis and Futuna, and Tahiti require a level 
of negotiation to implement the provisions 
of the Accord. As detailed above, divisions 
within as well as between the competing camps 
of loyalists and independence supporters 
makes forming a consensus more difficult.
In Bougainville, the ABG can vote not to 
hold a referendum, but the complex process 
required for this decision under the Bougainville 
constitution makes it almost impossible to 
achieve. Beyond this, Port Moresby’s lack of 
capacity to fund the necessary transition means 
there are pragmatic reasons to question the 
viability of a postcolonial state in Bougainville. 
And in both cases, Australia, New Zealand 
and neighbouring Pacific island states are 
calculating the impacts on regional stability, 
economic capacity and human security that 
two new sovereign nations would generate. 
Regional and international context
South Sudan, New Caledonia, and Bougainville 
are all cases where a deferred referendum 
on independence has been used as part of 
a package intended to end violent disputes. 
However post‑independence violence in South 
Sudan might suggest a need for caution in 
use of the precedent elsewhere. There will 
certainly be strong international interest in 
what happens in the post‑referendum situations 
in New Caledonia and Bougainville. 
The lesson that Bougainville has drawn from 
consideration of the South Sudan experience has 
been that it is important that the Bougainville 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm20                                                                                                                             Department of Pacific Affairs
Nic Maclellan and Anthony Regan
to a referendum on self‐determination, unlike 
French Polynesia’s 2004 autonomy statute and 
the 1961 statute for Wallis and Futuna. Unlike 
the Noumea Accord, the other autonomy statutes 
are not ‘irreversible’, so powers transferred from 
Paris to French Polynesia or Wallis and Futuna 
can be taken back by future governments. 
The 2016 decision to incorporate New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia as full members 
of the PIF has also complicated relations between 
the forum and the FLNKS. This is amplified by the 
increasing strategic partnership between France 
and Australia — the largest forum member — in 
the face of growing Chinese influence in the Pacific. 
Successive ALP and Coalition governments have 
downgraded support for decolonisation as they look 
to a broader geopolitical partnership with France 
in the Indo‑Pacific region (Carroll and Ell 2017). 
For these reasons, New Caledonia’s 
independence movement increasingly relies on 
the MSG for international support (for example, 
to attend the 2018 meeting of the Non‑Aligned 
Movement in Azerbaijan). Within the MSG, 
successive PNG governments have actively assisted 
the FLNKS since the 1980s with diplomatic and 
financial support. However the MSG clearly 
will not play the same role for Bougainville.
The promised referendums in New Caledonia 
and Bougainville, as well as popular support for 
self‑determination across Melanesia, complicate 
the scenario for West Papua. The issue of West 
Papua has divided the MSG and forum, with 
larger governments like Australia, PNG and Fiji 
backing Jakarta’s policies, while smaller island 
states support the United Liberation Movement 
for West Papua. Civil society activists make 
little distinction between self‑determination 
in New Caledonia (recognised by the UN 
General Assembly as a non–self governing 
territory) and movements in postcolonial 
states like Indonesia and PNG. Indonesia has 
also expanded its diplomacy across the MSG 
states to weaken support for the West Papuan 
nationalist movement, and will not welcome 
independence in a PNG province as a precedent 
for its provinces of Papua and West Papua.
Some scholars and officials argue that the 
age of decolonisation is over, and the best that 
non–self governing territories can expect is some 
form of negotiated autonomy. Unlike Tokelau, 
Guam or American Samoa, however, there are 
still strong independence movements across 
Melanesia. There is also a changing international 
context around self‑determination, with nationalist 
movements in the OECD (from Scotland to 
Catalonia) as well as developing nations.
Are regional governments ready for significant 
political changes across Melanesia? The lack 
of media scrutiny and public debate suggests 
otherwise. Pacific governments and citizens need 
to get ready for the outcomes of the looming 
referendums: good, bad or just muddling through.
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Endnotes
1.  Philippe Gomes 2017. President of the Calédonie 
Ensemble party (CE or Caledonia Together), 
interview with Nic Maclellan.
2.  Ibid.
3.  Daniel Goa July 2108. President of the Union 
Calédonienne party (UC or Caledonian Union), 
interview with Nic Maclellan.
4.  Paul Neaoutyine May 2014. President, Party of Kanak 
Liberation (Palika), interview with Nic Maclellan, 
Ponerihouen.
5.  For more on the development of the Panguna mine, 
see Mamak and Bedford 1974; Denoon 2000.
6.  There are no reliable estimates of the number of 
deaths, mainly because no records are available, 
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particularly for deaths of BRA personnel, 
extra‑judicial killings and deaths attributed to the 
blockade. For a discussion of the difficulties with the 
data, see Braithwaite et al. 2010:83–92.
7.  The words ‘North Solomons’ were used in the name 
of Bougainville’s provincial government to emphasise 
links to neighbouring Solomon Islands. However 
the name of the province, as determined by the 
Organic Law on Provincial Boundaries, remained 
Bougainville. For discussion of the issues involved, 
see Regan 2005:xxvi–xxviii.
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